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Abstract—We introduce a model of the fidelity of open
systems—fidelity being interpreted here as the compliance be-
tween corresponding figures of interest in two separate but
communicating domains. A special case of fidelity is given by
real-timeliness and synchrony, in which the figure of interest is
the physical and the system’s notion of time. Our model covers
two orthogonal aspects of fidelity, the first one focusing on a
system’s steady state and the second one capturing that system’s
dynamic and behavioural characteristics. We discuss how the two
aspects correspond respectively to elasticity and resilience and we
highlight each aspect’s qualities and limitations. Finally we sketch
the elements of a new model coupling both of the first model’s
aspects and complementing them with machine learning. Finally,
a conjecture is put forward that the new model may represent a
first step towards compositional criteria for antifragile systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
As well-known, open systems are those that continuously
communicate and “interact with other systems outside of
themselves” [1]. Modern electronic devices [2] and cyber-
physical systems [3] are typical examples of open systems
that more and more are being deployed in different shapes
and “things” around us. Advanced communication capabilities
pave the way towards collective organisation of open systems
able to enact complex collective strategies [4] and self-organise
into societies [5], communities [6], [7], networks [8], and
organisations [9].
One of the most salient aspects of open systems—as well
as a key factor in the emergence of their quality—is given by
the compliance between physical figures of interest and their
internal representations. We call this property as fidelity. A
high fidelity makes it possible to build “internal” models of
“external” conditions, which in turn can be used to improve
important design goals—including performance and resilience.
Conversely, low fidelity results in unsatisfactory models of the
“world” and the “self”—an argument already put forward in
Plato’s Cave.
As an example, real-time systems are open systems that
mainly focus on a single figure—physical time. Such fig-
ure is “reified” as cybertime—an internal representation of
physical time. Intuitively, the more accurately the internal
representation reflects the property of a corresponding physical
dimension, the higher will be the quality exhibited by such
class of open systems.
In what follows we consider the more general case of
n-open systems—systems that is that interact with environ-
ments represented through n context figures. This means
that, through some sensory system and some sampling and
conversion algorithms, each of these n context figures is
reified in the form of an internal variable reflecting the state
of the corresponding figure. These “reflective variables” [10]
are the computational equivalent of the biological concept
of qualia (pl. quale) [11] and represent an open system’s
primary interface to their domains of intervention (typically,
the physical world.)
This work introduces two models for the fidelity of n-open
systems. Each of those models provides a different view to an
n-open system’s nature and characteristics.
The first model is presented in Sect. II and mainly focuses
on elasticity support to fidelity. Quality is reached through
simple schemes with as limited as possible an overhead and
as low as possible an impact on functional design goals.
Resource scheduling, redundancy, and diversity are mostly
applied through worst-case analyses and at design-time, pos-
sibly with simple switching among Pareto-optimal strategies
during the run-time [2]. As mentioned above, the key strategy
in this case is elasticity: unfavourable changes and faults are
meant to be masked out and counterbalanced by provisions
that do not require intensive system reconfigurations. This
model considers the system and its intended deployment
environments as known and stable entities (cf. synchronous
system model [12]) and identifies a snapshot of the system in
its intended (viz., “normal”) operational conditions.
Conversely, our second model—introduced in Sect. III—
is behavioural and focuses on resilience support to fidelity.
Systems and their environments are regarded as dynamic
systems whose features are naturally drifting in time (as it is
the case, e.g., in the timed-asynchronous system model [13]).
Corresponding variations in the operational conditions within
and without the system boundaries may be tolerated through
different strategies, and this model focuses on the quality of
the behaviours that a system may employ, during the run-time,
in order to guarantee its fidelity despite those variations.
A discussion is then elaborated in Sect. IV. Positive and neg-
ative aspects of both models are highlighted. Then it is shown
how the two models may co-exist by distinguishing between
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normal and critical conditions. A general scheme for context-
conscious switching between elasticity and resilience strategies
is proposed. Said scheme also incorporates a machine learning
step such that the system may acquire some form of “wisdom”
as a by-product of past history. A conjecture is put forward
that the general scheme may represent a first preliminary step
towards the engineering of antifragile systems [14], namely
systems not merely able to tolerate adverse conditions, but
rather able to strengthen in the process their ability to do so.
Section V finally concludes with a view to our future work.
II. ALGEBRAIC MODEL
Here we introduce our first model of fidelity. First the main
objects of our treatise are presented in Sect. II-A. Section II-B
follows and introduces our Algebraic model based on those
objects.
A. Formal entities
As mentioned in Sect. I, open systems are those computer
systems that interact with a domain they are immersed in.
A prerequisite to the quality of this interaction is the per-
ception [15] of a domain- and application-specific number of
figures, say 0 < n ∈ N. The quality of the perception services
is the cornerstone to fidelity [16], the latter taking the shape of,
e.g., optimal performance, strong guarantees of real-timeliness
and safety, high quality of experience, and so forth.
Perception in n-open systems is modelled in what follows
as a set of functions qi, 0 < i ≤ n, defined between pairs
of Algebraic structures, U i and Ci, 0 < i ≤ n, respectively
representing sets of physical properties of interest (called in
what follows as “raw facts”) and sets of their corresponding
computer-based operational representations—their “reflective
variables”, or “quale”. “Reflective maps” is the term we shall
use to refer to the above functions.
Let us refer as U and C respectively as to any of the U i
and Ci, and as q to any of the reflective maps. Thus, if u ∈ U
is, e.g., the amount of light emitted by a light-bulb, then q(u)
may for instance be a floating point number stored in some
memory cells and quantifying the light currently emitted by
the bulb as perceived by some sensor and as represented by
some sampling and conversion algorithm. A reflective map
takes the following general form:
q : U → C (1)
and obeys the following Condition:
∀u1, u2 ∈ U : q(u1 + u2) = q(u1) + q(u2) + ∆. (2)
Here overloaded operator “+” represents two different op-
erations:
• In U , as in the expression on the left of the equal
sign, operator “+” is the property resulting from the
composition of two congruent physical properties. As an
example, this may be the amount of light produced by
turning on two light-bulbs in a room, say light-bulb l1
and light-bulb l2. (Note that the amount of light actually
perceived by some entity in that room will depend on
the relative positions of the light-bulbs and the perceiver
as well as on the presence of obstructing objects in the
room, and other factors.)
• In C, as in the expression on the right of the equal
sign, operator “+” is the algorithm that produces a valid
operational representation of some property by adding
any two other valid representations of the same property.
In the above example, the operator computes the qualia
corresponding to the sum of the quale representing the
light emitted by l1 with that of l2.
Let ∆ be a variable representing any ∆i, 0 < i ≤ n, in
turn defined as the “preservation distance” of reflective map
qi, meaning that qi would preserve operation “+” were it not
for the extra ∆i. Quantity ∆ thus represents an error value that
depends on the nature of the involved properties; their opera-
tional representations; and “the environment”, the latter being
modelled as a set of context figures representing the hardware
and software platforms; the operational conditions; the user
behaviours; and other factors. Environmental conditions shall
be cumulatively represented in what follows as vector ~e.
B. Model
Function (1) and Condition (2) may be used to characterise
concisely the fidelity of an n-open system, namely how
coherent, consistent, and robust is the reflection in Ci of the
physical properties of U i, 0 < i ≤ n. Our exemplary focus in
the rest of this section will be that of real-time systems (namely
1-open systems whose domains of interests are cybertime1 and
physical time) though this will not affect the generality of our
treatise. In the rest of this section C will refer to cybertime
and U to physical time. The corresponding reflective map shall
be simply referred to as q while ∆ shall be q’s preservation
distance.
The formal cornerstone of our model is given by the concept
of isomorphism—a bijective map between two Algebraic
structures characterised by a property of operation preserva-
tion. As well-known, a function such as reflective map q is a
isomorphism if it is bijective and if the preservation distance ∆
is equal to zero. In this case the two domains, C and U , are in
perfect correspondence: any action (or composition thereof)
occurring in either of the two structures can be associated
with an equivalent action (resp. composition) in the other one.
In the domain of time, this translates in perfect equivalence
between the physical and artificial concept of time—between
cybertime and physical time that is. Different interpretations
depend on the domain of reference. As an example, in the
domain of safety, the above correspondence may mean that
the consequence of C-actions in terms of events taking place
in U be always measurable and controllable—and vice-versa.
Obviously the above flawless correspondence only charac-
terises a hypothetically perfect computer system able to sustain
its operation in perfect synchrony with the physical entities
it interacts with—whatever the environmental conditions may
1We shall refer in what follows to any artificial concept of time, as
manifested for instance by the amount of clock ticks elapsed between any
two computer-related events, as to “cybertime”.
be. The practical purpose of considering such a system is
that, like Boulding’s transcendental systems [17] or Leibniz’s
Monads and their perfect power-of-representation [18], it is
a reference point. By identifying specific differences with
respect to said reference point we can categorise and parti-
tion existing families of systems and behaviours as per the
following definitions.
Definition 2.1 (Hard real-time system): A hard real-time
system is the best real-life approximation of a perfect real-
time system. Though different from zero, its preservation
distance (the ∆ function, representing in this case the system’s
“tardiness”) has a bound range (limited by an upper threshold)
equal to a “small” interval (drifts and threshold are, e.g., one
order of magnitude smaller than the reference time unit for
the exercised service). A hard real-time system is typically
guarded, meaning that the system self-checks its preservation
distance.
In what follows we shall call as “t-hard real-time system”
a system that matches the conditions in Definition 2.1 with
threshold t.
Definition 2.2 (Soft real-time system): A system is said to
be “soft real-time” if its preservation distance ∆ is statistically
bound. As in hard real-time systems, a threshold characterises
the ∆ error function, but that threshold is an average value,
namely there is no hard guarantee, as it was the case for
hard real-time systems, that the error will never be overcome.
Both threshold and its standard deviation are “small”. As hard
real-time systems, also soft real-time systems are typically
guarded—viz., they self-check their tardiness (preservation
distance.)
In what follows we shall call a “(t, σ)-soft real-time system”
a system that matches the conditions in Definition 2.2 with
average threshold t and standard deviation σ.
Definition 2.3 (Best-effort real-time system): A system is
said to be “best-effort” if care and experience have been
put to use, up to a certain degree2, in order to design and
craft that system; said care and experience, to the best of the
current knowledge and practise, should allow the ∆ values
experienced by the users to be considered as “acceptable”,
meaning that deviations from the expected behaviours are
such that the largest possible user audience shall not be
discouraged from making use of the system. Internet-based
teleconferencing systems are examples of systems in this
category. Unlike hard and soft real-time systems, best effort
systems do not monitor the drifting of their ∆3.
It is important to highlight once more how function ∆ is also
a function of ~e—the environmental conditions. As mentioned
already, the above conditions include those pertaining to
the characteristics and the current state of the deployment
platform. As a consequence of this dependency, special care
2A trade-off between design quality, usability, time-to-market, costs and
other factors typically affects and limits the employed care.
3In some cases monitoring data are gathered from the users. As an example,
the users of the Skype teleconferencing system are typically asked to provide
an assessment of the the quality of their experience after using the service.
This provides the Skype administrators with statistical data regarding the ∆’s
experienced by their users.
is required to verify that the system’s deployment and run-
time hypotheses will stay valid over time. Sect. III specifically
covers this aspect. Assumption failure tolerance [19] may be
used to detect and treat deployment and run-time assumption
mismatches.
Definition 2.4 (Non-real-time system): A non real-time
system is one that is employed, deployed, and executed, with
no concern and no awareness of the drifting of function ∆.
With respect to time, the system is context-agnostic and is
meant to be used “as is”—without any operational or quality
guarantee.
Definitions 2.1–2.4 can be used to partition systems into
disjoint blocks (or equivalence classes). Said classes may be
regarded as “contracts” that the systems need to fulfil in order
to comply to their (real-timeliness) specifications.
Definition 2.5 (System identity): We define as system real-
time identity (in general, its system identity) the equivalence
class a (real-time) system belongs to.
We now discuss a second and complementary aspect—
system behaviour and its effect on the correspondence between
C and U .
III. BEHAVIOURAL MODEL
As already hinted in Sect. I, our Algebraic model and its
Definitions 2.1–2.4 do not cover an important aspect of open
systems [1], namely the fact that, in real-life, the extent and
the rate of the environmental changes may (as a matter of
fact, shall) produce a sensible effect on ~e (and thus, on ∆)
even when the system has been designed with the utmost care.
In this case the system may experience an “identity failure”,
namely a drift4 that produces a loss of the system identity (cf.
Def. 2.5).
In order to capture a system’s ability to detect, mask,
tolerate, or anticipate identity failures, that system needs to
enact a number of resilient behaviours [15], [21]. In what
follows we first briefly introduce the concepts of resilience
and behaviours (respectively in Sect. III-A and Sect. III-B) and
then discuss in Sect. III-C how resilient behaviours constitute
a second “parameter” with which one may characterise salient
aspects of the fidelity of open systems.
A. Resilience
Resilience is a system’s ability to retain certain character-
istics of interest throughout changes affecting itself and its
environments. By referring to Sect. II-B and in particular to
Def. 2.5, resilience may be defined as robust system identity
persistence, namely a system’s “ability to pursue completion
(that is, one’s optimal behaviour) by continuously re-adjusting
oneself” [15]. Resilience closely corresponds to the Aris-
totelian concept of entelechy [22], [23], namely “exercising
activity in order to guarantee one’s identity”, or to “comply to
one’s ‘definition’.”
4The problem of system identity drift going undetected is one that may pro-
duce serious consequences—especially in the case of safety-critical computer
systems. This is efficaciously expressed by quoting Bill Strauss: “A plane is
designed to the right specs, but nobody goes back and checks if it is still
robust” [20].
As suggested in [21], resilience calls for (at least) the
following three abilities:
• Perception, namely the ability to become timely aware of
some portion of the raw facts in the environment (both
within and without the system boundaries).
• Awareness, which “defines how the reflected [raw facts]
are accrued, put in relation with past perception, and
used to create dynamic models of the self and of the
world” [15], [24].
• Planning, namely the ability to make use of the Aware-
ness models to compose a response to the changes being
experienced.
A general scheme for robust system identity persistence is
then given by the following three phases:
1) Monitor the drifting of the ∆ functions.
2) Build models to understand how the drifting is impacting
on one’s system identity.
3) Plan and enact corrective actions such that the system
identity is not jeopardised.
Phases 2. and 3. refer to the concept of behaviour—which is
the subject of next subsection.
B. Behaviour
Behaviour is defined in [25] as “any change of an entity
with respect to its surroundings5”. In the context of this paper
behaviour is to be meant as any change an entity enacts
in order to sustain their system identity. In other words,
behaviour is the response a system enacts in order to be
resilient. In the cited paper the authors discuss how the above
mentioned response may range from simple and predefined
reflexes up to complex context-aware strategies. The following
classes are identified:
1) Passive behaviour: the system is inert, namely unable to
produce any “output energy”.
2) Active, non-purposeful behaviour. Systems in this class,
albeit “active”, do not have a “specific final condition
toward which they strive”.
3) Purposeful, non-teleological (i.e., feedback-free) be-
haviour. A typical example of systems exercising this
type of behaviour is given by servo-mechanisms.
4) Teleological, non-extrapolative behaviours are those typ-
ical of reactive systems. A feedback channel provides
those systems with “signals from the goal”. Behaviour
is then adjusted in order to get “closer” to the goal as
it was perceived through the channel. Reactive systems
function under the implicit hypothesis that the adjusted
behaviours bring indeed the system closer to the goals.
5) Predictive behaviours are typical of proactive systems,
namely systems that base their action upon a hypothe-
sised future state computed through some model. In [25]
predictive behaviours are further classified according
to their “order”, namely the amount of context vari-
ables their models take into account. Thus a system
5Here and in what follows, when not explicitly mentioned otherwise, quotes
are from [25].
tracking the speed of another system to anticipate its
future position exhibits first-order predictive behaviours,
while one that considers, e.g., speed and flightpath,
is second-order predictive. Systems constructing their
models through the correlation of two or more “raw
fact” dimensions, possibly of different nature, are called
higher-order predictive systems.
The above model of individual behaviour may be naturally
extended by considering collective behaviours—namely the
conjoint behaviours of multiple individual systems. We dis-
tinguish three major classes of collective behaviour:
1) Neutral social behaviour. This is the behaviour resultant
from the collective action of individual, purposeful,
non teleological behaviours. Each participant operates
through simple reflexes, e.g., “in case of danger get
closer to the flock”. Lacking a “signal from the goal”, the
rationale of this class of collective behaviours lies in the
benefits deriving by the sheer number of replicas avail-
able. Examples include defencive behaviour of a group
of individuals from a predator and group predation.
2) Individualistic social behaviour. This is the social be-
haviour of systems trying to benefit opportunistically in
a regime of competition with other systems. Here partic-
ipants make use of more complex behaviours that take
into account the social context, namely the behaviours
exercises by the other participants. It is worth noting how
even simple “systems” such as bacteria may exercise this
class of behaviour [26], [27].
3) Cooperative or coopetitive social behaviours. These are
social behaviours of systems able to establish mutualistic
relationships (mutually satisfactory behaviours) and to
consider proactively the future returns deriving from a
loss in the present. Examples of behaviours in this class
are, e.g., the symbiotic relationships described in [6],
[28].
As a final remark we deem worth noting how resilience
and change tolerance are not absolute properties: in fact they
emerge from the match with the particular conditions being
exerted by the current environment. This means that it is not
possible to come up with an “all perfect” solution able to
withstand whatever such condition. Nature’s answer to this
dilemma is given by redundancy and diversity. Redundancy
and diversity are in fact key defence frontlines against tur-
bulent and chaotic events affecting catastrophically an (either
digital or natural) ecosystem. Multiple and diverse “designs”
are confronted with events that determine their fit. Collective
behaviours increase the chance that not all the designs will be
negatively affected. In this sense we could say that “resilience
abhors a vacuum”, for empty spaces—namely unemployed
designs and missed diversity—may potentially correspond to
the very solutions that would be able to respond optimally to
a catastrophic event.
A treatise of collective behaviours is outside the scope of
this paper. Interested readers may refer to, e.g., [4], [26], [29],
[30].
C. Fragility as a measure of assumptions dependence
The type of behaviour exercised by a system constitutes—
we deem—a second important characteristic of that system
with reference to its ability to improve dynamically its system-
environment fit. This “second coordinate” of a system’s fidelity
to systemic, operational, and environmental assumptions is
meant to bring to the foreground how dependant an open
system actually is on its system model—namely, on its
prescribed assumptions and working conditions [12], [31].
Classes of resilient behaviours allow us to assess qualita-
tively a system’s “fragility” (conversely, robustness) to the
variability of its environmental and systemic conditions. As
an example, let us consider the case of traditional electronic
systems such as, e.g., the flight control system that was in use
in the maiden flight of the Ariane 5 rocket. A common trait
in such systems is that enacted behaviours are mostly very
simple (typically purposeful but non-teleological). While this
enhances efficiency and results in a lean and cost-effective
design, one may observe that it also produces a strong
dependence on prescribed environmental conditions. It was
indeed a mismatch between the prescribed and the experienced
conditions that triggered the chain of events that resulted in
the Ariane 5 failure [19].
IV. BEYOND BOTH ELASTICITY AND RESILIENCE
We have introduced two complementary models to reason
about the fidelity of open systems. The two models are
orthogonal, in the sense that they represent two independent
“snapshots” of the system under consideration:
1) The Algebraic model regards the system as a predefined,
immutable entity. The system conditions may drift but
the system exhibits no complex “motion”—no sophisti-
cated active behaviours are foreseen in order to reduce
the drift.
2) The behavioural model captures instead the dynamicity
of the system. Also in this case the system measures
the system-environment fit, but the system may actively
use this measure in order to optimise its quality and
execution.
Intuitively, the first model is backed by redundant resources
dimensioned through worst-case analyses; events potentially
able to jeopardise quality are masked out. The minimal non-
functional activity translates in low overhead and simple
design. Embedded systems typically focus on this approach.
Conversely, the second model calls for complex abilities—
among others awareness; reactive and proactive planning;
quorum sensing [26]; collective strategy planning [4], etc.
Events jeopardising quality are tolerated rather than masked;
moreover, complex analyses and strategies are mandated by
the overhead typically associated with non-functional be-
haviours. This notwithstanding, said behaviours may be the
only effective line of defence against the highly dynamic
environments characterising open embedded systems (such as
cyber-physical things [3]) and, a fortiori, future collective
cyber-physical societies [5] and fractal social organisations [9].
Though orthogonal in their assumptions, the overheads
associated with the design approaches corresponding to the
above two models are not side-effect free (suffice it to consider
the effect of complex behaviours on the worst-case analyses
called for, e.g., by hard real-time systems). Our tentative
answer to this problem is given by a new general scheme
revising the one presented in Sect. III-A. In the new scheme
the systems perform as follows:
1) Monitor the drifting of their ∆ functions and possibly
other context figures providing insight on the current
environmental conditions.
2) Build simple, low-overhead models of the turbulence
and chaotic nature of their environments.
3) While the current conditions and trend are deemed as
“unsafe”, repeat:
a) Build and maintain more complex reactive and
proactive models to understand how the drifting
is impacting on one’s system identity.
b) Plan and enact corrective behaviours choosing be-
tween the following two options:
i) Self-reconfiguration: the system reshapes itself
by choosing new system structures and new
designs best matching the new environmen-
tal conditions. Examples of self-reconfiguration
strategies may be found, e.g., in [19].
ii) Establish social relationships with neighbour-
ing systems. This may include for instance
simple actions such as “join collective sys-
tem” or “leave collective system”, opportunistic
strategies such as “improve one’s ∆’s to the
detriment of those of neighbouring systems”,
or complex mutualistic relationships involving
association, symbiosis, or mutual assistance.
An example of said mutualistic relationships is
described in [15].
c) Measure the effectiveness of the attempted solu-
tions, rank them with respect to past solutions,
derive and persist conclusions, and update the
reactive and proactive models accordingly.
As can be clearly seen from its structure, the above scheme
distinguishes two conditions: one in which system identity is
not at stake, and correspondingly complexity and overhead
are kept to a minimum, and one when new conditions are
emerging that may result in identity failures—in which case
the system switches to more complex behaviours. A self-
managed, dynamic trade-off between these two approach, we
conjecture, may provide designers with a solution reconciliat-
ing the benefits and costs of both options. We refer to future
systems able to exercise said dynamic trade-offs as to “auto-
resilient”—a concept first sketched in [15].
As a final remark, the machine learning step 3c in the above
scheme implies that the more a system is subjected to threats
and challenging conditions, the more insight will be acquired
on how to respond to new and possibly more threatening situ-
ations. We conjecture that insight in this process may provide
the designers with guidelines for engineering antifragile cyber-
physical systems [14].
V. CONCLUSIONS
We presented two orthogonal models for the synchrony
and real-timeliness of open computer systems such as modern
electronic systems [2], cyber-physical systems, and collective
organisations thereof. We discussed how each of the two
models best-match certain operational conditions—the former,
stability; the latter, dynamicity and turbulence. Finally, we
proposed a scheme able to self-optimise system processing
depending on the experienced environmental conditions. As
the scheme also includes a machine learning step potentially
able to enhance the ability of the system to adjust to adverse
environmental conditions we put forward the conjecture that
antifragile systems may correspond to systems able to learn
while enacting elastic and resilient strategies. Future work will
be devoted to simulating compliant systems with the support
of self-adaptation frameworks such as ACCADA [32], [33]
and Transformer [34], [35].
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